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Substantially Burdened, Substantially in Conflict, or 
Substantially Unneeded? A Discussion of Abdulhaseeb 
v. Calbone 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Tenth Circuit’s recent decision in Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone1 
highlights the difficulty and conflicting rules courts face in 
determining when the government has placed a substantial burden 
on an inmate’s religious rights. In Abdulhaseeb, the Tenth Circuit 
considered the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act2 (“RLUIPA”), which provides, inter alia, that “[n]o government 
shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a 
person residing in or confined to an institution.”3 Although the 
substantial burden requirement of RLUIPA is fundamental to the 
statute’s application, the term is not defined within the statute, and 
circuit courts have differed in their interpretation of this 
requirement. To address this problem, the Tenth Circuit attempted 
to synthesize the various circuit rules by holding that a government 
substantially burdens an inmate’s religious expression if it  
(1) requires participation in an activity prohibited by a 
sincerely held religious belief, or (2) prevents participation in 
conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious belief, or (3) 
places substantial pressure on an adherent either not to 
engage in conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious 
belief or to engage in conduct contrary to a sincerely held 
religious belief.4  
This Note argues that the Tenth Circuit’s synthesized rule is 
problematic for two reasons. First, by combining the two prevalent 
but different tests used in the different circuits into one test, the rule 
undermines precedent and exacerbates the friction between the 
various circuit rules. Second, the third part of this rule provides little 
 
 1. 600 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1 to 
-5) (2006). 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2006). 
 4. Abdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d at 1315. 
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guidance for application and opens the door for judges to base their 
decisions on their preferences instead of precedent.  
Part II of this Note discusses the facts and history of 
Abdulhaseeb. Part III discusses the context, political situation, and 
background leading up to the decision in Abdulhaseeb. Finally, Part 
IV discusses the problems inherent in the third part of the test 
postulated by the Tenth Circuit and the resulting need to eliminate 
that prong. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
From June 4, 2001, to January 27, 2005, Madyun Abdulhaseeb 
was incarcerated at Great Plains Correction Facility (“GPCF”).5 
While a prisoner at GPCF, Abdulhaseeb requested that he be 
provided with a halal diet, but his requests were denied.6 After three 
years of incarceration, Abdulhaseeb submitted a formal grievance 
charging that GPCF forced him to accept gelatin and puddings on 
his meal trays in violation of his beliefs.7 Abdulhaseeb argued that, 
although GPCF indicated that the pudding and gelatin were halal 
and kosher, there was nothing on the packaging to substantiate that 
claim; thus, GPCF should have provided him with a satisfactory halal 
substitute.8 The administrator at GPCF denied Abdulhaseeb’s 
grievance and indicated that no one was forcing Abdulhaseeb to have 
gelatin or pudding on his tray.9 The administrator also noted that 
there was no pork or pork byproduct in the gelatin or pudding; 
therefore, in his opinion, those products met Abdulhaseeb’s religious 
standards.10 
A month after GPCF denied his initial grievance, Abdulhaseeb 
filed another grievance with GPCF arguing that the prison should 
provide halal chickens for all the prisoners in celebration of the 
 
 5. Id. at 1306. Oklahoma contracts with GPCF, a private prison, to hold Oklahoma 
prisoners. Id. 
 6. Id. A halal diet, also known as a “lawful” diet, prohibits consumption of food that is 
deemed to be unlawful (“haram”). Id. at 1313. It requires one to abstain from eating “pork 
and its byproducts, animals improperly slaughtered or killed, alcohol and intoxicants, blood 
and blood byproducts, and foods contaminated with haram products.” Id. (citing What is 
Halal?, ISLAMIC FOOD AND NUTRITION COUNCIL OF AMERICA, http://www.ifanca.org/ 
halal/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2011)).  
 7. Id.  
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. at 1307. 
 10. Id.  
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Islamic feast Eid-ul-Adha.11 Again, GPCF denied his request for 
accommodation.12 The GPCF administrator stated that “DOC policy 
allows you [Abdulhaseeb] to purchase a Hallal meal through an 
approved vendor. The practice at GPCF, which includes the current 
year, is to provide a Hallal meal at the conclusion of Ramadan” but 
not for the Eid-ul-Adha feast.13 After receiving this denial, 
Abdulhaseeb unsuccessfully appealed to the Oklahoma Department 
of Corrections (“ODOC”).14 
Three months after his second grievance, GPCF transferred 
Abdulhaseeb to the Oklahoma State Penitentiary (“OSP”), a prison 
administered by ODOC.15 After arriving at OSP, Abdulhaseeb again 
requested a halal diet.16 Specifically, he wrote a letter stating, “I am a 
Muslim. I request a Halal diet that is consistent with my sincerely 
held religious beliefs and does not substantially burden my freedom 
of religious expression. . . . Your non-pork common fare diet and 
vegetarian diet are not diets that are consistent with Islamic dietary 
laws.”17 Like the GPCF administrators, OSP officials denied his 
request and responded by indicating that they only provided two 
alternative diets for religious reasons: non-pork and vegetarian.18  
After receiving this denial, Abdulhaseeb filed another grievance 
asking for a halal diet, but OSP again denied his request, citing the 
two alternative diets available to Abdulhaseeb.19 Abdulhaseeb again 
unsuccessfully appealed to ODOC.20  
Following ODOC’s denial of his request, Abdulhaseeb filed 
seventeen claims21 in district court alleging, inter alia, that GPCF and 
OSP violated his rights under RLUIPA by not providing him with a 
halal diet.22 GPCF and OSP both moved for summary judgment on 
all seventeen counts, and the district court entered judgment in favor 
 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id.  
 13. Id.  
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. at 1307–08. 
 21. Abdulhaseeb filed twelve claims against GPCF and five claims against OSP. Id. at 
1308–09. 
 22. Id. at 1308. 
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of GPCF and OSP on eight of the claims and dismissed the 
remainder of the claims.23 Abdulhaseeb then appealed to the Tenth 
Circuit.24 
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Religious Practices and Inmates 
Religious practices are very prevalent among prison inmates 
within the United States prison system.25 For instance, one study 
conducted in the South Carolina prison system found that nearly half 
of prison inmates attend religious services, and that those who attend 
do so six times a month on average.26 This is seen as a positive trend, 
since the number and severity of inmate infractions decreases as 
inmates become more involved with religious practices.27 In 
addition, courts have noted that “deny[ing] the opportunity to 
affirm membership in a spiritual community . . . may extinguish an 
inmate’s last source of hope for dignity and redemption,”28 which 
may decrease the likelihood of rehabilitation for an inmate. 
Consequently, religion is “one of the best rehabilitative influences 
we can have” on inmates.29  
B. Religious Expression: A Varying Standard 
The legal standard for determining an inmate’s right to religious 
expression has varied over time. Initially, recognizing the need for a 
framework to protect the individual’s right of religious expression, 
the Supreme Court held, in Sherbert v. Verner,30 that the government 
cannot pass a law that infringes on an individual’s religious liberties 
unless the law survives strict scrutiny; that is to say, unless the 
 
 23. Id. at 1309. Judgment was not entered on claims 6–9 and 14–17 because the court 
held that they were not ripe due to non-exhaustion of remedies. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Thomas P. O’Connor & Michael Perreyclear, Prison Religion in Action and Its 
Influence on Offender Rehabilitation, in RELIGION, THE COMMUNITY, AND THE 
REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS 11, 12 (Thomas P. O’Connor & Nathaniel J. 
Pallone eds., 2002).  
 26. Id. at 21. 
 27. Id. at 11. 
 28. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 368 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 29. 139 CONG. REC. S14,367 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Orrin 
Hatch). 
 30. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
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government demonstrates that the law achieves a “compelling state 
interest” and utilizes the least restrictive means of achieving that 
interest.31 The Court further upheld this judicial requirement in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder32 by concluding that “only those interests of the 
highest order . . . can overbalance legitimate claims to the free 
exercise of religion.”33 Thus, if a law infringed upon religious 
expression, it had to be the least restrictive means of achieving a 
compelling interest of the highest order to pass the stringent test 
articulated in Sherbert and Yoder. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, courts continued to apply the 
rationale of Sherbert and Yoder to free exercise claims by prisoners.34 
Beginning in the late 1980s, however, the Court departed from its 
reasoning in Sherbert and Yoder by subjecting laws that infringed 
upon religious expression to a standard that resembled, though was 
not explicitly, rational basis review.35 This more deferential review 
continued until finally, in Employment Division v. Smith,36 the Court 
explicitly rejected the “compelling governmental interest” standard 
of Sherbert altogether and replaced it with rational basis review.37 
Although this was a departure from its prior standard, the Court 
reasoned that generally applicable laws that incidentally burden 
religious expression were subject only to rational basis review—not 
strict scrutiny.38  
C. Statutory Responses to Smith 
In response to the Supreme Court’s application of the rational 
basis standard to a religious freedom case, Congress passed the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act39 (“RFRA”), which effectively 
 
 31. Id. at 406, 407. 
 32. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 33. Id. at 215. 
 34. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Meachem, 540 F.2d 1057 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. 
Fisher, 571 F. Supp. 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Masjid Muhammad-D.C.C. v. Keve, 479 F. Supp. 
1311 (D. Del. 1979). 
 35. See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350–51 (1987); Daniel J. Solove, 
Faith Profaned: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Religion in the Prisons, 106 YALE 
L.J. 459, 470 (1996) (discussing the evolution of rational basis and strict scrutiny in regards to 
religious expression). 
 36. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 37. Id. at 885–89. 
 38. Id. 
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006). 
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legislatively reversed Smith and reinstituted the strict scrutiny 
standards from Sherbert and Yoder.40 The pertinent sections of RFRA 
prohibited the government from “substantially burden[ing] a 
person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of 
general applicability”;41 yet, the Act did not define “substantially 
burden.”42  
However, four years after Congress passed RFRA, the Supreme 
Court, in City of Boerne v. Flores, struck down the Act as applied to 
state and local governments.43 The Court reasoned that because 
Congress has only the “power ‘to enforce,’ not the power to 
determine what constitutes a constitutional violation,” Congress 
exceeded its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment when it 
passed RFRA.44 
Congress responded to the Court’s holding in Flores by enacting 
RLUIPA three years later. RLUIPA closely mirrors the provisions of 
RFRA, but limits its scope to land use and institutionalized 
persons.45 The Act provides that  
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the 
religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an 
institution . . . unless the government demonstrates that 
imposition of the burden on that person (1) is in furtherance 
of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest.46  
While RLUIPA, like RFRA, failed to explicitly define “substantial 
burden,” the legislative history indicates that it is to be interpreted in 
 
 40. See Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise 
Clause, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65, 102 (1996); Abbott Cooper, Dam the RFRA at the Prison Gate: 
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s Impact on Correctional Litigation, 56 MONT. L. REV. 
325, 325–26 (1995). 
 41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. 
 42. 146 CONG. REC. S16,698, 16,700 (July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin 
Hatch and Sen. Edward Kennedy). 
 43. See 521 U.S. 507, 532–36 (1997). However, the federal government still must 
follow RFRA. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 
424 (2006). 
 44. Flores, 521 U.S. at 519. 
 45. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5; Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 567 (5th Cir. 
2004). 
 46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). 
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reference to RFRA and its jurisprudence.47 As a result, circuit courts 
have interpreted RLUIPA according to RFRA and its jurisprudence, 
yet still significantly differ as to when government action 
substantially burdens an inmate’s religious beliefs. 
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION 
In Abdulhaseeb, a three-member panel of the Tenth Circuit 
reversed the district court’s decision to grant GPCF and OSP’s 
motions for summary judgment.48 Specifically, the court held that 
GPCF and OSP may have “substantially burdened” Abdulhaseeb’s 
religious exercise by refusing to provide him with a halal diet or halal 
chickens for the Eid-ul-Adha feast.49   
A. General Requirements of RLUIPA 
In deciding whether GPCF and OSP violated RLUIPA, the 
court reasoned that RLUIPA required Abdulhaseeb to demonstrate 
that he desired to participate in “(1) a religious exercise (2) 
motivated by a sincerely held belief, which exercise (3) [was] subject 
to a substantial burden imposed by the government” to succeed in 
his claims.50 The court briefly discussed the general elements of the 
first two requirements, but reasoned that since GPCF and OSP did 
not challenge the “religious nature of Abdulhaseeb’s beliefs” and 
there was no evidence in the record that Abdulhaseeb did not 
sincerely hold his expressed beliefs, it did not need to rule on these 
issues.51 Rather, the court held that the dispositive issue was whether 
 
 47. 146 CONG. REC. S16,698, 16,700 (July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin 
Hatch and Sen. Edward Kennedy). See also Grace United Methodist Church v. City of 
Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 661 (10th Cir. 2006) (concluding that the substantial burden 
standard under RFRA applied to RLUIPA). 
 48. Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1309 (10th Cir. 2010). Although 
Abdulhaseeb alleged seventeen different claims against OSP and GPCF, this Note is only 
concerned with claims five and ten, which allege that GPCF and OSP violated RLUIPA by 
denying Abdulhaseeb a halal diet. 
 49. Id. at 1315. 
 50. Id. at 1312–13 (citing Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 960 (10th Cir. 2001)). 
 51. Id. at 1313–15. In his concurrence, Judge Gorsuch explicitly stated that the “only 
question before the court is whether the government has imposed a substantial burden” since 
the government did not contest Abdulhaseeb’s “religiosity or the sincerity of [his] beliefs.” Id. 
at 1324 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
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the government “substantially burdened” Abdulhaseeb’s religious 
exercise.52  
B. Defining “Substantial Burden” under RLUIPA 
Abdulhaseeb presented the Tenth Circuit with its first 
opportunity to interpret the meaning of “substantial burden” under 
RLUIPA.53 The court, after reviewing other circuit decisions that 
clarified the term, concluded that the government substantially 
burdens an individual’s religious exercise when it  
(1) requires participation in an activity prohibited by a 
sincerely held religious belief, or (2) prevents participation in 
conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious belief, or (3) 
places substantial pressure on an adherent either not to 
engage in conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious 
belief or to engage in conduct contrary to a sincerely held 
religious belief.54 
The court opined that the first and second parts of the rule were 
self-explanatory, but believed that the third part, “substantial 
pressure,” needed additional explanation.55 To explain the third part 
of its rule, the court provided several examples.56 First, the court 
concluded that a government substantially pressures an inmate if it 
provides him or her with a “Hobson’s choice.”57 The court defined a 
Hobson’s choice as an “illusory choice where the only realistically 
possible course of action trenches on an adherent’s sincerely held 
religious belief.”58 Essentially, if the government requires an inmate 
to choose between eating food that the inmate considers against his 
religious beliefs or not eating at all, then the court would consider 
the choice a Hobson’s choice.59  
Second, in accordance with congressional intent,60 the court 
reviewed Supreme Court decisions prior to Smith that defined 
 
 52. Id. at 1315 (majority opinion). 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 1315. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 1317. 
 60. See 146 CONG. REC. S16,698, 16,700 (July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. 
Orrin Hatch and Sen. Edward Kennedy). 
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“substantial burden” and parenthetically reasoned that “substantial 
pressure on an adherent to modify . . . behavior”61 and “indirect 
coercion or penalties”62 were additional examples of substantial 
pressure sufficient to constitute a substantial burden. The court 
provided several other parenthetical observations but concluded that 
not “every infringement on a religious exercise will constitute a 
substantial burden,”63 and that the court would need to evaluate on 
a case-by-case basis the level of inconvenience to an individual’s 
religious practice in order to determine whether the burden should 
be considered “substantial.”64 
C. Did OSP Violate RLUIPA by Failing to Provide Abdulhaseeb with 
a Halal Diet? 
After defining the third part of the rule, the Tenth Circuit 
considered whether OSP substantially burdened Abdulhaseeb’s 
religious expression by not providing him with a halal diet. In 
particular, the court concluded that the government substantially 
pressured Abdulhaseeb because it left him with a Hobson’s choice: 
Abdulhaseeb could either eat a diet that violated his sincerely held 
belief, or not eat at all.65 The court reasoned that “it is one thing to 
curtail various ways of expressing belief, for which alternative ways of 
expressing belief may be found. It is another thing to require a 
believer to defile himself, according to the believer’s conscience, by 
doing something that is completely forbidden by the believer’s 
religion.”66 In addition, the court noted that other courts have held 
that failure to provide a halal diet may substantially burden the 
religious exercise of a Muslim.67  
 
 61. Abdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. 
Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717–18 (1981)). 
 62. Id. at 1316 (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 
450 (1988)). 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. (citing Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2004)). 
 65. Id. at 1317. 
 66. Id. (quoting Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179, 1192 (10th Cir. 2002)). 
 67. Id. (citing Hudson v. Dennehy, 538 F. Supp. 2d 400, 411 (D. Mass. 2008); 
Thompson v. Williams, No. C06-5476FDB-KLS, 2007 WL 3244666, at *19 (W.D. Wash. 
Oct. 31, 2007); Caruso v. Zenon, No. 95-MK-1578 (BNB), 2005 WL 5957978, at *12 (D. 
Colo. July 25, 2005)). Moreover, Judge Gorsuch, in his concurrence, noted that “[t]o say that 
access to edible food qualifies as ‘an important benefit’ is to put it mildly” and that the 
government substantially pressured Abdulhaseeb’s religious expression by not providing a halal 
diet. Id. at 1325 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
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OSP argued that it did not force Abdulhaseeb into a Hobson’s 
choice because it allowed the option of purchasing a halal diet from a 
possible outside vendor, but the court rejected this argument.68 The 
court first noted that this is an unreasonable option for an indigent 
inmate, such as Abdulhaseeb, since he would still effectively be 
barred from obtaining the halal food as he lacked the requisite 
finances.69 Moreover, the court, citing an affidavit from a chaplain at 
GPCF,70 noted that there was no approved halal vendor for ODOC, 
and that it was ODOC’s policy that all vendors be preapproved 
before they could deliver food.71 Thus, although a cursory analysis 
seemed to indicate that Abdulhaseeb did have methods to obtain a 
halal diet, this nonetheless was not the case while he was incarcerated 
at OSP, since both OSP and GPCF had the same food policies.72 
However, although withholding a halal diet may have substantially 
burdened Abdulhaseeb’s religious exercise, the court remanded 
Abdulhaseeb’s claim on different grounds: that the government 
failed to address whether the burden resulted from a “compelling 
governmental interest” along with whether the government used the 
“least restrictive means” in accomplishing its interest.73  
D. Was the Denial of Halal Meat for an Islamic Feast a Substantial 
Burden to Abdulhaseeb’s Religious Exercise? 
After considering whether OSP may have substantially burdened 
Abdulhaseeb’s religious exercise, the Tenth Circuit next considered 
Abdulhaseeb’s additional claim that GPCF’s failure to provide halal 
meat for an Islamic feast, Eid-ul-Adha, violated RLUIPA.74 The 
court began by explicitly rejecting the district court’s reasoning that 
the “failure to celebrate the Feast itself would [not] substantially 
burden . . . [Abdulhaseeb’s] religious exercise.”75 Specifically, the 
 
 68. Id. at 1317 (majority opinion).  
 69. Id. But see id. at 1326 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (indicating that RLUIPA does not 
require “the state to provide prisoners—even indigent prisoners—with everything they need 
for religious purposes”).  
 70. Although the court was evaluating the actions of OSP, the court used testimony of a 
GPCF chaplain since GPCF and OSP both fall under ODOC and follow ODOC policies. Id. 
at 1317–18 (majority opinion). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1318. 
 74. Id. at 1319–20.  
 75. Id. at 1319. 
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court reasoned that the district court erred by not inferring from 
Abdulhaseeb’s complaint that Abdulhaseeb wanted to “observe a 
halal diet for both feast and non-feast days, and that halal meat is 
important to this feast.”76 The court also decided that “if an inability 
to eat proper foods for a religious holiday prevents one from 
engaging in conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious belief or 
forces one to engage in conduct prohibited by a sincerely held 
religious belief, it may constitute a substantial burden.”77  
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit rejected the district court’s 
reasoning that failure to provide halal meat on Eid-ul-Adha did not 
violate RLUIPA, since the “faith community” could purchase festive 
or ceremonial meals according to ODOC policy.78 Particularly, the 
Tenth Circuit noted that ODOC policy requires halal meat to be 
purchased from an “approved vendor,” but the record indicated no 
such vendor existed.79 As a result, the court concluded that there 
may have been periods when there was no approved halal vendor for 
GPCF; thus, there may have been a time where Abdulhaseeb’s 
religious exercise was substantially burdened.80 The court held that 
this fact might allow a reasonable jury to find that GPCF 
substantially burdened Abdulhaseeb’s religious exercise by 
prohibiting halal meat for the Eid-ul-Adha feast. Consequently, the 
court remanded his claim.81 
V. ANALYSIS 
This case is an example of the Tenth Circuit wanting to have its 
cake and eat it too: the Tenth Circuit wanted the benefits of 
synthesizing the rules of the other circuits into a flexible standard, 
yet still wanted the benefits of a rigid rule that would provide notice 
and guidance to the lower courts. The court tried to achieve these 
benefits by creating a three-part test that is a mixture of straight-
forward rules (parts one and two of the test) and a flexible standard 
(part three of the test). However, by crafting the test in this way, it 
failed to achieve any of the benefits. This Part first discusses the 
 
 76. Id. (emphasis added). 
 77. Id. at 1319–20. 
 78. Id. at 1320. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. at 1320. 
 81. Id. 
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conflict created among the circuits through the creation of the Tenth 
Circuit’s hybrid rule and then discusses the inherent problems of the 
third part of the rule. 
A. Substantially in Conflict 
The Tenth Circuit, by combining the two prevailing tests within 
the circuits into one test, created a three-part test that conflicts with 
nearly every other circuit to some degree. As a result, the Tenth 
Circuit’s rule contributes to inconsistent outcomes in applying 
RLUIPA and undermines precedent. 
1. How the Tenth Circuit’s rule conflicts with the other circuits 
Parts one and two of the Tenth Circuit’s rule mirror the rules 
found in the District of Columbia and Seventh Circuits, but part 
three of the test conflicts with the D.C. and Seventh Circuits. In 
particular, the first two parts of the Tenth Circuit’s rule indicate that 
a government substantially burdens an inmate’s religious expression 
if it “requires” or “prevents” religiously expressive conduct.82 
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit recognizes a substantial burden when the 
government “forces” or “prevents [an inmate] from engaging in 
conduct their religion requires.”83 Likewise, the Seventh Circuit 
indicates that the government substantially burdens a plaintiff when 
it “forces” or “compels conduct or expression that is contrary” to the 
individual’s religious expression or “inhibits or constrains conduct or 
expression” that is central to an individual’s religious belief.84 The 
wording of these rules denotes a defined bright-line rule whereby a 
court can easily ascertain whether the government’s action 
significantly burdens the inmate’s religious expression, because the 
words provide a more objective inquiry into the actions of the 
government.85 Although these tests require a higher showing from a 
 
 82. Id. at 1315 (emphasis added). 
 83. Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). 
 84. Mack v. O’Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added), rev’d on 
other grounds, 522 U.S. 801 (1997). The Seventh Circuit later interpreted these phrases to 
mean that the force or inhibition must be substantial enough to make an inmate’s religious 
expression “effectively impracticable.” See Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 800 (7th Cir. 2008); 
Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 85. To illustrate, it is easier for a court and an observer to objectively determine when a 
rule or a regulation becomes so onerous that it effectively “forces” or “compels” an individual to 
obey because we all have some natural sense or experience of being forced to act. 
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plaintiff than the pressure standards used by other circuits, an 
individual’s natural understanding and experience with these words 
helps courts uniformly apply the law.  
In contrast, part three of the Tenth Circuit’s rule allows mere 
“substantial pressure” to be sufficient for a substantial burden—a less 
stringent standard than parts one or two of the rule. Consequently, 
by allowing “substantial pressure” to be sufficient for a “substantial 
burden” within the Tenth Circuit, the third part of the court’s rule 
conflicts with the rules articulated in the D.C. and Seventh Circuits, 
where mere “pressure” is insufficient to constitute a substantial 
burden. 
Additionally, although part three of the Tenth Circuit’s rule is 
ostensibly labeled a “substantial pressure” test, it is not really a 
substantial pressure test and thus contradicts the substantial pressure 
tests of the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.86 
Specifically, the Tenth Circuit articulated its substantial pressure 
standard to mean the pressure that occurs when “the government 
presents the plaintiff with a Hobson’s choice—an illusory choice, 
where the only realistic possible course of action trenches on the 
adherent’s sincerely held religious belief.”87 Although the court 
initially defined the term “pressure” with different synonyms,88 its 
overall rule hinges on whether the government’s pressure constitutes 
a Hobson’s choice for an inmate.  
For instance, the court decided that the government substantially 
burdened Abdulhaseeb’s religious expression because it provided 
him with a Hobson’s choice.89 In reaching this holding, the court 
determined that this occurs because a Hobson’s choice requires an 
inmate to either violate his religious beliefs or forego “essentials,” 
such as medical treatment,90 eating,91 or communicating with legal 
 
 86. See Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2007); Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 
174 (4th Cir. 2006); Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2004); San Jose Christian Coll. 
v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2004); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of 
Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 87. Abdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d at 1315. This definition of pressure is attached by a dash to 
the court’s initial articulation of the third part of the test, seemingly indicating that a Hobson’s 
choice is what the court meant by “substantial pressure.” 
 88. See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text. 
 89. Abdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d at 1318 
 90. Id. (quoting Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179, 1189 (10th Cir. 2002)). 
 91. Id. at 1315. 
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representatives.92 Additionally, the court noted that Hobson’s 
choices are “choices between options that are mutually 
unacceptable” to the practice of the inmate’s religious faith. 
 Moreover, after noting that the pressure synonyms used by other 
circuits were helpful in determining what constitutes substantial 
pressure, the court stated that “not every infringement on a religious 
exercise will constitute a substantial burden.”93 This statement, 
which immediately follows the pressure synonym discussion, bolsters 
the argument that the Tenth Circuit intended a higher, more 
stringent test for substantial pressure than its sister circuits. As a 
result, the Tenth Circuit’s substantial pressure test is not akin to the 
substantial pressure tests of the other circuits, since it requires 
pressure analogous to “forcing” or “compelling” an inmate to act 
where the inmate does not really have a choice. However, the third 
part is still a diluted and less stringent standard than the “forcing” or 
“compelling” tests of the D.C. and Seventh Circuits, because the 
Tenth Circuit still uses the pressure synonyms to advocate a lesser 
standard similar to the ones used by the majority of the circuits. 
Thus, the third part of the court’s rule conflicts to some degree with 
nearly every other circuit.   
2. Consequences of a synthesized rule that conflicts with other circuits 
Using a synthesized rule that conflicts with all the other circuits 
to some degree is problematic for two reasons: first, it contributes to 
inconsistent outcomes; and second, it dilutes precedent and enables 
lower courts in the Tenth Circuit to decide cases according to 
preference—not precedent. 
a. Inconsistent outcomes. An application of the different circuits’ 
tests to the facts of Abdulhaseeb highlights the problems that arise 
with the Tenth Circuit’s synthesized rule. In particular, if 
Abdulhaseeb were an inmate within the Seventh or D.C. Circuits, it 
is unlikely that he could prove that OSP’s refusal to provide him with 
a halal diet violated RLUIPA. Specifically, OSP’s actions likely fell 
short of “forcing” or “compelling” him to act in a manner that was 
contrary to his centrally held belief, since providing a Hobson’s 
choice to an inmate does not rise to the level of “forcing” or 
 
 92. Id. at 1318 (quoting Beerheide, 286 F.3d at 1189). 
 93. Id. at 1316. 
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“compelling” religious expression. This is evident from the reasoning 
in Abdulhaseeb, where the court ignored the first two parts of its new 
rule, which mirrored the D.C. and Seventh Circuit tests, and relied 
on its third prong—substantial pressure—which incorporates the 
Hobson’s choice reasoning to conclude that OSP likely violated 
RLUIPA by failing to provide Abdulhaseeb with a diet.94 
Consequently, although Abdulhaseeb faced the difficult decision of 
choosing between eating food that was not within a halal diet and 
not eating everything given to him and likely going hungry, it is 
unlikely that this decision amounted to a substantial burden to his 
religious expression under the D.C. and Seventh Circuit’s rules.  
However, if Abdulhaseeb were an inmate within a circuit other 
than D.C. or the Seventh, he would likely have a stronger argument 
that OSP violated his rights by not providing a halal diet, since those 
circuits follow a substantial pressure test. Nevertheless, although 
Abdulhaseeb’s argument would be stronger in those circuits, there is 
no absolute assurance Abdulhaseeb’s claim would meet their 
substantial pressure standards, since the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning 
regarding what constitutes substantial pressure is vague95 and 
inconsistent with the substantial pressure standards of those 
circuits.96 Thus, application of the different circuit tests to 
Abdulhaseeb highlights the problem of having three different 
standards: an inmate’s religious rights, rather than being protected 
by RLUIPA (a national and theoretically uniformly-applied law), are 
determined by the physical location of the inmate’s incarceration. 
Therefore, the court should have decided which circuits had the best 
argument and aligned itself with them, rather than creating a new 
hybrid rule that exacerbates a split and creates a greater gamble for 
an inmate and his or her rights under RLUIPA. 
b. Decisions according to preference, not precedent. The Tenth 
Circuit’s synthesized three-part rule is uniquely problematic because 
it allows lower courts to select nearly any “substantial burden” 
precedent from any circuit to support its preferred outcome. 
Specifically, lower courts can draw analogies from any other circuit, 
since the rule postulated by the Tenth Circuit contains at least one 
prong that mirrors the rules and precedent of all the other circuits. 
 
 94. Id. at 1317–18. 
 95. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 96. See supra notes 86–93 and accompanying text.  
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As a result, this ability to look to other circuits waters down the 
precedential value of opinions within the Tenth Circuit, as lower 
court judges are not necessarily bound by decisions within the Tenth 
Circuit and can use decisions from different circuits to support their 
desired result. Thus, the Tenth Circuit’s synthesized three-part rule 
conflicts with its sister circuits and dilutes precedential value by 
allowing judges to decide cases according to their preferences, but 
not necessarily according to Tenth Circuit precedent. 
B. Substantially Unneeded: The Need to Eliminate Part Three of the 
Tenth Circuit’s Test 
Abdulhaseeb was the first time the Tenth Circuit had the 
opportunity to evaluate the “substantial burden” requirement of 
RLUIPA,97 and as a result the court had a responsibility to draft the 
rule in a manner that provided guidance to the lower courts. 
However, the Tenth Circuit did not provide the needed guidance 
but instead included a prong in its test that is substantially vague in 
its explanation of what constitutes a substantial burden. Thus, part 
three of the Tenth Circuit’s rule should be eliminated altogether. 
1. Substantially vague 
The third part of the Tenth Circuit’s rule states that the 
government substantially burdens an inmate’s right to religious 
expression if it “places substantial pressure on an adherent either not 
to engage in conduct . . . or to engage in conduct contrary to a 
sincerely held religious belief.”98 Notably, the Tenth Circuit tries to 
define “substantial pressure” in two ways: first, it provides the 
Hobson’s choice analogy,99 and second, it arbitrarily cites different 
phrases from past Supreme Court decisions and then reasons that 
they all apply in determining whether a burden is considered 
substantial.100 Unfortunately, this reasoning is vague and does little 
to define or articulate the meaning of substantial pressure. 
 
 97. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 98. Abdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d at 1315. 
 99. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
 100. Abdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d at 1316. For example, the court cites six different Supreme 
Court cases that use different language to articulate elements to weigh in determining whether 
or not there is substantial pressure. Id. at 1315–16.  
DO NOT DELETE 4/5/2011 8:12 PM 
189 Substantially Burdened 
 205 
a. Hobson’s choice. Although a “Hobson’s choice” explanation 
seems to provide guidance for lower courts, a deeper look reveals 
that it fails in this regard. Specifically, the court merely states that a 
Hobson’s choice is a choice that essentially “trenches” on an 
inmate’s religious expression. No guidance is given on the amount of 
“trenching” that is required, or what exactly constitutes “trenching.” 
The court tries to partially answer this question in a parenthetical, 
nearly two pages after stating the trenching rule, by noting that 
“forcing prisoners to decide between communicating with family and 
legal representatives, seeking medical treatment, and following 
religious tenets constitutes a Hobson’s choice rather than a true 
alternative.”101 Regrettably, this parenthetical merely provides 
examples, without explanations, of Hobson’s choices and fails to 
provide lower courts with a standard or rule regarding how much 
trenching or pressure an inmate must feel before it is deemed 
“substantial.” Consequently, lower courts, and readers, are left to 
their own devices in deciding the broad implications of substantial 
pressure. 
b. Arbitrary parenthetical phrases. In addition, the parenthetical 
phrases used by the Tenth Circuit to explain substantial pressure are 
inherently vague. In particular, the court notes that “indirect 
coercion,”102 indirect “compulsion,”103 and the level of 
“inconvenience”104 are factors to be considered in determining 
substantial pressure. These words give little guidance to the lower 
courts and seem circular since they are simply synonyms of 
uncomfortable “pressure.” Again, lower courts and readers have little 
guidance except perhaps the indication that they should check a 
thesaurus for additional unhelpful adjectives in resolving what 
actions constitute substantial pressure. Thus, the wording of the 
third part of the rule and its reasoning are vague and provide little 
assistance to the lower courts in determining when substantial 
pressure constitutes a substantial burden.  
 
 101. Id. at 1318 (quoting Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179, 1189 (10th Cir. 2002)). 
 102. See Lying v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450 (1998). 
 103. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717 (1981). 
 104. See Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1278 (11th Cir. 2007). 
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2. Substantially unneeded 
This lack of reasoning for the Hobson’s choice analogy and 
seemingly hodge-podge assortment of parenthetical phrases does not 
provide judges with clear precedent that they must adhere to and 
opens the door for lower courts to use their imagination to support 
their desired outcome.105 In particular, a judge in a lower court could 
have serious personal concerns about Islamic beliefs and, under the 
guise of part three of the rule, discriminate against an inmate. This 
lower court, using facts similar to Abdulhaseeb, could conclude that a 
prison, failing to provide an inmate with a halal diet, did not violate 
RLUIPA by reasoning that the refusal merely “urges” or 
“encourages” an inmate to eat food contrary to his religious belief. 
Further, the hypothetical court could reason that there is no 
coercion or inconvenience, since an inmate can always choose not to 
eat the non-halal food—a choice that any person on any kind of diet 
is required to make daily, and not one that “trenches” on his 
religious expression. Thus, lower courts can rely on synonyms to 
dodge the current precedent given by the court and mask their 
personal motives in the process. Additionally, as mentioned above, 
part three of the rule compounds the current split in the circuits and 
undermines precedential value within the Tenth Circuit.106 
Consequently, the court, to avoid the potential confusion among the 
lower courts, should eliminate the third part of its new test. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone does little 
to resolve the confusion surrounding what constitutes a “substantial 
burden” under RLUIPA. In particular, the synthesized rule adds to 
the confusion and is problematic for two reasons. First, it 
undermines precedent and aggravates the friction between the 
various circuit rules by creating a hybrid rule. A split was inevitable, 
since one already existed between the circuits, but by combining 
rules the Tenth Circuit contradicts each of the other circuits’ rules in 
some way and adds to the confusion of what constitutes a 
“substantial burden.” Second, the Tenth Circuit should eliminate its 
third prong, since it provides little guidance to the lower courts and 
 
 105. See supra Part V.A.2.b. 
 106. See supra Part V.A.2. 
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has the potential of allowing judges to mask their personal feelings 
and discriminate against inmates. Thus, to solve these problems and 
provide guidance to lower courts, inmates, and prison facilities about 
inmate religious rights for future cases, the Tenth Circuit should 
eliminate the obstructive third part of its “substantial burden” rule. 
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